Shift 31 · Trade · Systems

Trade rerouting, not retreating

Neutral

From direct US–China trade to trade routed through third countries and closer partners.

The evidence

US–China trade fell by about 30 per cent in 2025 and more than US$165 billion was pushed out of that corridor, yet global goods trade still grew by about 6.5 per cent.

Source: McKinsey Global Institute

Supporting the shift

Four series that should each move in the shift’s direction.

Supports

China's share of US goods imports

Down by more than half from its 2017 peak

Supports

US imports from Mexico and Vietnam

Both have risen as China's share fell

Supports

China's exports to ASEAN

Chinese goods are flowing to third countries instead

Supports

Greenfield investment by destination

New factories are being sited in connector economies

Contesting the shift

Two series that complicate or limit it, chosen as the strongest objections.

Contests

China's share of world exports

China's global share is at or near a record, so it has not been displaced

Contests

Chinese content in Mexican and Vietnamese exports

Much rerouting is relabelling: dependence on Chinese inputs persists

0 of this shift’s 6 series are drawn from published figures. The others give their argument and link to where the data is kept.

Also in Trade

  1. 32Open markets yielding to tariff walls
  2. 33Trade growth moving from goods to services
  3. 34Mineral sourcing shifting from price to security