Shift 31 · Trade · Systems
Trade rerouting, not retreating
Neutral
From direct US–China trade to trade routed through third countries and closer partners.
The evidence
US–China trade fell by about 30 per cent in 2025 and more than US$165 billion was pushed out of that corridor, yet global goods trade still grew by about 6.5 per cent.
Source: McKinsey Global Institute
Supporting the shift
Four series that should each move in the shift’s direction.
Supports
China's share of US goods imports
Down by more than half from its 2017 peak
Supports
US imports from Mexico and Vietnam
Both have risen as China's share fell
Supports
China's exports to ASEAN
Chinese goods are flowing to third countries instead
Supports
Greenfield investment by destination
New factories are being sited in connector economies
Contesting the shift
Two series that complicate or limit it, chosen as the strongest objections.
Contests
China's share of world exports
China's global share is at or near a record, so it has not been displaced
Contests
Chinese content in Mexican and Vietnamese exports
Much rerouting is relabelling: dependence on Chinese inputs persists
0 of this shift’s 6 series are drawn from published figures. The others give their argument and link to where the data is kept.